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Caught between war repressions
and party purge
The loyalty of Kalinin Party members put to the test of the Second World
War
Pris entre les répressions de la guerre et les purges du parti. La loyauté des
membres du parti de Kalin in mise à l’épreuve de la Secon de Guerre mondiale
Vanessa Voisin
1 “The institutions of purge and verification were born with the Bolshevik Party itself. The
quest for purity among the revolutionaries’ ranks was at the heart of the Marxist-Leninist
ethos.”1 Indeed, from its origins, the Bolshevik Party underwent regular purges aiming at
expelling socially alien (admitted on a fake autobiography), incompetent or undisciplined
members, or those who strayed from the general line. Despite the calming down of Party
life after the mass expulsions of the Great Purges, the new Statute of 1939 presented the
purge as a basic principle of Party management.2 So the Party cleansing in the aftermath
of  the  liberation  from Nazi  rule  suited  both  Party  routine  as  well  as  extraordinary
circumstances.  The  discovery  of  numerous  acts  of  collaboration  with  the  enemy,
including those committed by Party activists or leaders, strengthened the conviction of
the existence of a “fifth column” in the country, and even inside the organs of power.3
But the context of war tended to increase the urgency and the complexity of the purge.
On one hand, there was a lack of activists, many Party members being mobilized in the
army while others had died during the occupation, but on the other hand it was essential
to purify the organization from those members who discredited themselves and the Party
with the population. More profoundly, the Second World War changed the criteria that
defined the good communist, completing a shift initiated in the 1930s from genealogical
criteria of appraising a communist (social origin, political past...) to criteria focused on
the inner “self” of the communist.4 As class war was declared over in the mid-1930s, the
enemy could no longer be unmasked through careful inquiry on his social origins and
political past. From now on, the remains of the bourgeois past had to be tracked down in
the conscience of individuals, even in the case of communists.
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2 This article will try to seize the role of the war in this process. Indeed, how a communist
reacted to the threats hanging over the Bolshevik project was the best test to measure his
understanding of the social and political mission of the Party. The war was the ultimate
test and for years after the conflict, the criteria of censure and expulsion would be closely
linked to their own individual attitude during the war. Citizens from the liberated areas
were subjected to latent suspicion, but the highest pressure was put on the supervision
structures from which the State especially expected loyalty. It is important to point out
that, though they often intersected and overlapped, the purge of the Party and the purge
of  the  economic  and  State  administrations  did  not  always  follow  the  same  logic.5
Moreover, in my opinion it is a mistake to draw general conclusions about the purge of
the Party using examples concerning the “cadres”6 First,  the cadres were not always
Party members, especially at the lowest levels, so their purge must be studied separately.
Second, cadres underwent an often smoother purge than the purge of the organizations
in  general,  obviously  because  officials  and  managers  were  necessary  to  rebuild  the
administration and the economy, at least until demobilized soldiers came back from the
front starting from the summer and autumn of 1945. To lighten the text, I will limit the
analysis to the case of Party members, while trying to determine whether the sanction
differed according to the position they occupied before the invasion.
3 Contrary to the rich Western historiography on administrative and professional purges of
collaborators after the liberation, the study of the Party purge of the war years remains
underdeveloped, and the publications dating from Soviet times do not even mention the
purge.7 Amir  Weiner’s  pioneer  work,  published  in  2001,  paved  the  way  for  further
research  with  its  major  conclusions  about  the  role  of  the  second  world  conflict  in
redefining  Soviet  identities.8 Other  local  or  national  studies  about  the  aftermath  of
liberation or/and the transition from war to peace touched on to this topic,  such as
Nathalie Moine’s rich study of the Slantsy district (province of Leningrad), Jeffrey Jones’
work on the “reconstruction” of Rostov-on-the-Don or the works dealing with the process
of  sovietization  in  the  Baltic  states.9 Lastly,  Rebecca  Manley’s  recent  book  on  the
evacuation and re-evacuation has brought up central questions about the confrontation
of  conflicting  war  experiences,  while  providing  a  solid  basis  for  understanding  the
circumstances, often chaotic, of the departure of local authorities on the eve of invasion.10
4 The present paper will  try to give some insights into the process of redefining Party
loyalty  and Party ethos  through the ordeal  of  the war.  The case  study at  hand,  the
province of Kalinin, allows one to trace the very beginning of the purge in January 1942
and to follow its evolution through the different stages of the war. The corpus consists of
reports  from  and  to  the  Organization  and  Instruction  Department  of  the  Central
Committee (Orginstruktotdel TsK) which give an overview of the purging process in the
Soviet Union as well as of Moscow’s criticism and orders.11 Provincial archives provide
invaluable material  on concrete implementation of the purge in the field,  week after
week,  and  on  diverging  understandings  of  the  meaning  of  the  process  at  local  and
regional levels.12 Finally, the analysis of a delimited number of cases allows an evaluation
of the respective weight of the various criteria used to determine whether the communist
should be reinstated or expelled from the Party.
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5 First, I shall briefly present the general context of the purge in the province of Kalinin
and of its launching. Then I shall study the conflicting understandings of the purge by the
different levels of power in the Party. Last, I shall discuss the meaning of the charges held
against  the  expelled  communists,  keeping  in  mind  the  European  context  of
administrative sanction of collaborators.
 
Launching the purge: an urgent and crucial question
A miniature USSR
6 The province of Kalinin borders the provinces of Leningrad in the North and of Moscow
in the South,  the Latvian and Belorussian republics in the West  and the province of
Yaroslav in the East (see map). What makes it of interest to the study is that the districts
of the region suffered different fates during the war: the German troops never invaded
the  north-eastern  part  of  the  Kalinin  province,  while  the  districts  surrounding  the
provincial center underwent a short-time occupation and the western and southern ones
were submitted to the enemy for several months, and for some of them, for years (see
map). The first districts to fall into enemy hands, at the beginning of July 1941, were the
western ones; they remained under occupation until the end of 1943 or the year 1944. The
others were mainly invaded in the autumn of 1941,  during the “Operation Typhoon”
launched by the Germans on October 2,  1941. While Kalinin was occupied, from mid-
October to mid-December 1941, the provincial authorities were evacuated to Kashin, the
administrative center of a north-eastern district, while the industrial and agricultural
equipment was sent far in the rear when the time left made it possible. From Kashin, the
provincial Party committee (Obkom) and the regional head of NKVD (UNKVD) organized
the  underground  resistance  in  occupied  territory  and  prepared  embryos  of  new
authorities  –  especially  the  district  Party  and State  committees  and the  local  NKVD
organs – in anticipation of the liberation of the invaded districts.
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7 The province was a sort of miniature USSR at war: in the rear, it had never been invaded
and provided relatively safe conditions (although it did suffer strong bomb attacks) to
organize and lead the fight further west, while a strip of districts remained under threat
and  constituted  an  intermediary  space  between  the  front  and  the  rear.  Lastly,  the
occupied territory was progressively freed, first becoming an undefined zone between the
front and the rear, and then a rear: the priorities in these territories depended on their
closeness to the front and their vulnerability. The most striking feature is that, despite its
proximity  to  Moscow  (less  than  200  kilometers),  the  province  was  not  completely
liberated until July 1944.
8 The first wave of liberation took place in December 1941-January 1942, during the Soviet
counter-offensive of the “Battle of Moscow.” The German invader left twenty districts
and four towns (Kalinin, Velikie Luki, Andreapol´, Kunia), but still held the southern and
western parts of the region. The first one was partly freed in the summer of 1942, and
then completely in March 1943, when the Wehrmacht abandoned Rzhev for the third and
last time. The twelve western districts still occupied in 1943 were not retaken by the Red
Army until 1944, during the two offensives of February and July. Soon after, many of
these districts were cut off from the Kalinin province to be included in the newly formed
provinces of Velikie Luki and Pskov.13
 
A Moscow top priority: purifying the Party
9 As early as January 4, 1942, the Party cell of the Kalinin Proletarskii district discussed the
question  of  the  communists  who  had  remained  on  occupied  territory:  most  of  the
speakers had just come back from the rural neighboring districts where they had fled,
and they  inclined to  pronounce  systematic  expulsion.14 In  other  liberated  provinces,
voices also expressed indignation about the scale of communist collaboration with the
enemy, and addressed the Party’s Central Committee to ask for the harsh punishment of
traitors.15 Indeed, the number of compromised communists filled the authorities with
dismay,  as  witness  the  reports  from Kalinin  and  Voronezh  in  early  1942,  Rostov,
Leningrad, Kabardino-Balkariia, Kursk, and Velikie Luki in 1943.16 Less than a month after
Kalinin was freed from Nazi rule, an inspector from the Central Committee arrived there
to evaluate the work of the authorities. He drew very stern conclusions about the Party’s
regional  committee:  the  latter  had  not  taken  vigorous  measures  to  foster  material
reconstruction, nor to develop active “political work” with the population of the freed
territory.  No  instructions  had  been  given  to  the  district  committees  about  the
communists  who  remained  in  invaded  areas,  while  in  some  neighborhoods,  they
represented  more  than  half  the  number  of  Party  members  before  the  invasion.  On
January 11, 1942, the NKVD had already arrested 15 communists for active collaboration
with the enemy.17
10 The local powers being overwhelmed by the material problems to solve, they did not give
enough  attention  to  the  Party  situation,  and  this  negligence  was  common  to  many
liberated areas.18 Therefore, Moscow decided to take things in hand. On January 17, 1942,
Shamberg, head of the Organization and Instruction Department of the Party’s Central
Committee (Orginstruktotdel), sent a note to the three Central Committee secretaries who
followed the implementation of the purge until  the end: A. Andreev, G. Malenkov, A.
Shcherbakov.19 He proposed a project for a Central Committee resolution dealing with
administrative  and  Party  purges.  The  quickness  of  the  Center’s  reaction  reveals  the
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significance attached to the purge at the highest political level,  an importance which
found confirmation in the following months. In early February 1942, the delegate of the
Party Control Committee (KPK) in Kalinin criticized the slow pace of the purge in the
provincial capital and in the districts of Staritsa, Turginovo, Zavidovo. The Obkom bureau
had to acknowledge its bad handling of the problem and to promise to give the necessary
instructions.20 Thereafter,  the Central  Committee kept a close eye on the purge from
beginning to end. In early March 1942, Shamberg informed the three secretaries that
many Party committees had not been paying enough attention to the purge: in Orël, only
23 cases had been examined in the preceding month, and the situation was not better in
Rostov.  As a  consequence,  traitors  still  stood in the Party,  and sometimes even held
positions of power. Therefore,  the Orginstruktotdel demanded regular accounts on this
topic,21 which remained a Moscow top priority until the end, becoming “one of the most
closely monitored purges in Soviet history.”22
 
Implementing the purge
11 I did not find any proof of Shamberg’s project being ratified in the central or regional
archives, but local reports suggest its main lines were adopted. As Shamberg proposed,
local authorities organized a thorough registration of all  Party members “in order to
expel the people who did not honor the title of member of the Bolshevik Party during the
fight against the fascist invaders.”23 The registration was to be announced in the local
press, and deadlines to be fixed: any Party member coming to the committee after the
deadline would be expelled (third and fourth points of Shamberg’s project). Another of
Shamberg’s suggestions seems to have been followed: the Party committees bureaus were
entrusted with the task of examining the cases, in contradiction with the Statute of 1939,
which defined the primary cells as the level of discussion of expulsion cases. A report
dated  August  1943  about  the  progress  of  the  purge  in  Kabardino-Balkariia  stated  it
unequivocally: the Elbrous local committee had made a mistake when it entrusted the
primary cells with the purge, because “most of their members remained on occupied
territory” and they reinstated a high number of communists who “had not deserved the
trust  of  the  Party.”24 Besides,  in  the  weeks  and  months  immediately  following  the
liberation, many cells had not yet been reconstituted.
12 The  rules  of  the  verification  process  worked  toward  reasserting  the  internal  Party
hierarchy. Any decision taken by the local committees had to be checked out and ratified
by the provincial committee, which had to meet often (three to five times a month) to
study communists’  personal  files.25 The Party Control  Committee kept a close eye on
provincial purges, while the Central Committee sent delegates in the field. In Kalinin, the
Central  Committee’s  delegate  attended  seven  sessions  out  of  47  in  1942.  This  tight
supervision allowed the center to exert pressure on regional organizations, to convince
them of the importance of the purge, and finally to impose a unique vision of the good
communist at war.26
13 Despite these peculiarities, the purge followed the main principles of the previous purges
since the mid-1930s: the examination of the personal files was to be strictly individual
and based on an inquiry.27 It meant that Moscow rejected a treatment of the problem by
categories, preferring to keep room for maneuver according to situations. That way, the
war  verification  was  part  of  the  regular  Party  purges  and did  not  seem to  bear  an
extraordinary  character.  Concerning  the  beginning  of  the  judicial  repression,  the
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authorities carefully avoided publicity over the process: the scale of collaboration from
Party members was not a topic to be on display. Despite the fact that chief editors of the
provincial newspaper, Proletarskaia Pravda, attended nearly all the sessions dealing with
expulsions from the Party between 1942 and 1945, I found no mention of the purge in the
local newspapers.28 Only Partiinoe Stroitel´stvo, the central organ devoted to the Party life,
briefly touched upon the subject in an article describing the restoration of Soviet power
in liberated territory:
The Party organization and the raikomy [district Party committees] are carrying out
a great cleansing work of Party ranks, expelling those who did not justify the noble
title of communist, who stained the name of Bolshevik out of human weakness or
cowardice.  The  underground  committee  expelled  Vasin  and  Plosnin  who  were
afraid of joining the partisan unit and fled away. Party organizations are closely
and  severely  examining  the  behavior  of  each  communist  who  remained  on
occupied territory by checking out their activities.29
14 The methods of verification were not described in Shamberg’s project, nor in any other
text I found. Kalinin archives do not keep the complete stenogramme of the district or
regional  bureau  sessions,  making  it  impossible  to  know  exactly  how the  facts  were
established, on which base the bureau made their decisions and how the discussions were
organized.  The archives  only contain “explanations” written by verified communists,
notes  prepared  by  the  local  committees  and  inquiry  reports  from the  NKVD,  which
informed the Party authorities of the arrest of a Party member.30 Some of these NKVD
documents  bear  a  manuscript  note of  a  Party official,  saying:  “A decision was taken
[date].”31 This state of the sources does not allow us to draw any conclusion about the
temporal  and causal  link between Party  inquiry  and censure and police  and judicial
procedures. Since December 1938, the Party secretary’s authorization had been needed
for the police or prosecutor to put a communist under arrest.32 But in the files I saw, the
NKVD informed the Party committee of an arrest after the fact, not waiting for any kind of
approval. We can assume that the purge of collaborators was a matter of great urgency
for the police – the war was still raging and the front not far away – and that in the eyes
of the NKVD the nature of the crime did not allow any kind of postponement for the
arrest.
15 After the district committee had made a decision, the member’s file was to be transmitted
to the Obkom where the conclusions were verified and ratified, or corrected. In Kalinin,
the  high  number  of  decisions  taken  at  each  session  of  the  regional  bureau  in  1942
suggests a hasty verification of the raikomy’s decisions. As for the rights of the checked
communists, they remained unclear until November 1943, when the Central Committee
adopted a decision stating that the expelled members could attend the Obkom bureau
session where their case was examined.33 The expelled communists could also appeal
against  the  decision  to  higher  Party  organs:  the  regional  committee,  the  Central
Committee, the Party Control Committee. Of course, if they were already under arrest,
there was a problematic infraction to Party rules.
16 What happened to the communists during the verification process? Sometimes it took
months,  and in the province of  Kalinin no document casts  light on their  position in
relation to the Party cell during this time. It seems that, at first, Moscow let the local
powers define their policy with regards to these members: in his March 1942 report about
the purge in Rostov, Shamberg underlined that the provincial committee decided to ban
them from Party  meetings,  because  they  tried  to  excuse  and  justify  their  shameful
behavior before their comrades.34 Anyhow, in Kalinin, the professional consequences of
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the purge were important.  The decisions of the regional bureau indicate the position
occupied before and after the occupation and clearly show a drop in status for nearly all
the compromised low-level officials, whether they had been arrested by the NKVD or not.
For example, when the cases of I. Boikov and V. Tsvetkov were verified by the Obkom,
both had already lost  their  jobs  as  chairman of  a  rural  soviet  for  the first  one,  and
chairman of  a collective farm for the other.  Boikov was expelled for not joining the
partisan unit and afterwards registering with the enemy police; Tsvetkov for serving as
an interpreter for the occupying troops. Surprisingly, the Party decisions did not mention
an arrest by the NKVD,35 contrary to many other cases examined in 1942 and, at a lower
level, in 1943.36 All in all, for the three months I picked randomly and studied in detail –
June and October 1942, June 1943 –, the degraded or dismissed officials who were still at
large made up 18% of the cases. The communists who kept their prewar job or found an
equivalent one – expelled from the Party or not –, represented a similar proportion, 20%.
Another quarter was made up of unemployed communists. There were also slight drops
in  status,  for  example,  skilled  workers  losing  their  position  and  finding  only
unspecialized jobs; but these cases were balanced by the number of promotions.37 Thus, if
some communists who underwent the occupation went on without serious professional
complications  after  the  liberation,  several  even  being  promoted,  61% of  the  studied
sample had to face prosecution, degradation or unemployment. Taking into account the
general lack of specialists and managers during the war, the drops in status were unlikely
to result from accident; most probably, they aimed to put aside suspicious or shameful
members.
17 As a time interval of an average of two months separated the decision of the district
committee  from the  ratification  by  the  Obkom,  judiciary  repression  and  professional
degradation usually preceded the Party’s final word. Despite that advantage – the Obkom
had more information at their disposal – the various visions of the purge at different
Party levels needed time to adjust to one another.
 
The chronology of the purge in Kalinin
18 After  the  first  Central  Committee  warning  in  early  1942,  the  purge  of  Kalinin’s
organization accelerated.  According to  the head of  the provincial  Orginstruktotdel,  on
March  3,  1942,  the  district  committees  had  already  ruled  on  51% of  the  1,150  files
registered at that time.38 During the same month, the Obkom took the pace and began to
meet four to five times a month,39 examining over a hundred cases during some sessions,
as on May 27 and June 10, 1942. Table 1 clearly shows that the bulk of the files was treated
in 1942, after the winter and the summer Soviet counteroffensives, followed by smaller
successes  in  the  fall.  Later,  the  share  of  the  war  purge  in  the  whole  number  of
communists’ files examined by the provincial committee regularly diminished: from 70%
in 1942 to 45% in 1943, 42% in 1944 and 30.5% in 1945. The relatively high figures of 1943
and 1944 correspond to new offensives by the Red Army and to the (re-) examination of
cases of the previous year.40 In 1945 and 1946, the Obkom treated a remainder of cases.
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Table 1. The purge progress in the province of Kalinin, 1942-1950
Sources: RGASPI, f.17, op.43, d.743-754; op.44, d.547-554; op.45, d.733-739; TTsDNI, f.147, op.4,
d.25-26; f.147, op.4, d.1111-1114; f.147, op.4, d.1521-1522; f.147, op.4, d.1947-1948.
19 In Kalinin, the purge began at a frantic pace during the first year (1942) but quickly
slowed down. It is difficult to compare with other Russian provinces since the examples I
have  found present  a  different  chronology of  the  liberation.  In  Rostov province,  for
example, the liberation also started in 1942, but the regional capital was retaken by the
enemy the same year. This probably explains, at least partly, why only 28% of the Rostov
war purge cases were ruled on during the first year (1942),  while 61.4% of the 3,081
Kalinin ones were decided during the same period. Nevertheless, in Rostov purification of
the  Party  from traitors,  cowards  and  shameful  members  was  over  in  late  194541;  in
Kalinin, where the number of communists who remained on invaded territory was three
times smaller, two percent of the identified cases still awaited decision.
20 The  specific  chronology  of  the  purge  in  the  province  of  Kalinin  probably  finds  an
explanation in the Obkom’s reaction to the Central Committee warning of February 1942.
Thereafter, First Secretary I.P. Boitsov closely supervised the progress of the cleansing in
the newly liberated areas.  Three times in 1942,  he reprimanded local  committees for
being slow or negligent in relation to the purge, and he made his reproaches public to the
other raikomy.42 Meanwhile, the local Party committees regularly sent him reports on the
progress  of  the  purge.43 The Obkom’s  control  was  obviously  loosened in  1943,  as  the
supervision of  the  Central  Committee  through its  delegates.  This  loosening probably
explains the critical fall of the number of war purge cases that were ruled on this year
(only 11.4% of the whole number of cases for 1942-1950), whereas this was a liberation
year (see map).
21 But the huge share of the year 1942 in the cleansing process does not mean that the local
powers quickly understood what was expected from them. In fact, they constantly groped
around the right  approach as  they had not  received clear-cut  instructions about the
criteria and methods they should use.44 However, the regional committee kept a leg up in
comparison with the district committees, because it was the first to receive the blame and
advice from the Central Committee.
 
Diverging visions of the purge
22 Shamberg’s project put the purge under the tight control of the Central Committee’s
Secretariat. Indeed, its Orginstruktotdel supervised local action by analyzing the reports
addressed by the regional powers and by sending delegates to the provinces. The latter
not only checked the progress of the purge, but also the decisions themselves and the
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supervision exerted by the Obkom. Their stern criticism was always followed by advice.
However, quite surprisingly, the areas liberated at a later period of the war did not seem
to benefit from the experience of earlier cases; in Vinnitsa, for example, the purge started
in a highly improvised manner and aroused exactly the same reproaches from Moscow as
the Kalinin or Voronezh purges two years before.45 Thus,  despite the great emphasis
placed on the purge by the central authorities, the passing on of the information and
advice was not always foreseen or effectively done.
23 Contrary  to  other  provincial  secretaries,  regularly  scolded  by  Moscow for  their  bad
supervising,46 Boitsov was only blamed at the beginning of the purge, in 1942, and after
the end of the war in November 1945.47 The discretion of the Central Committee suggests
they were quite satisfied about the way the Kalinin authorities were handling the purge.
But in the field, the Obkom had to review many decisions taken by the district committees
(see table 2).
 
Table 2. Obkom examination of decisions taken by the district committees
Source: RGASPI, f.17, op.43, d.743-754; op.44, d.547-554; op.45, d.733-739; TTsDNI, f.147, op.4,
d.25-26; f.147, op.4, d.1111-1114; f.147, op.4, d.1521-1522; f.147, op.4, d.1947-1948. Comment: in
several cases, the replacement of the membership card is associated with the cancellation of the
expulsion, which explains a total exceeding 100%.
24 During the first year, the provincial committee cancelled more expulsions (6.3%) than
reinstatements (3%);  moreover,  they pronounced nearly 30% decisions of issuing new
membership cards to the communists who had lost or destroyed their old one since the
Nazi invasion. One of the causes – probably the main one – of this relative leniency lay in
the  slapdash  job  of  the  raikomy which  expelled  communists  without  sufficiently
investigating their behavior during the occupation. In the examples provided in the Party
Control Committee’s reports, further inquiry revealed that the expelled members actually
displayed patriotism.48 Thus, the Kalinin city committee reinstated Solov´eva, expelled by
the Central district committee, because investigations found that she had hidden and
taken care of  a  wounded Soviet  soldier  lying in the street;  the Obkom approved and
ratified  this  decision.49 More  often,  the  cancellation  of  the  decisions  of  the  raikomy
resulted  from  the  consideration  of  some  circumstances  explaining  the  failure  of
evacuation and also of certain general criteria of behavior.
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25 As for the cancellations of reinstatements, the explanation resides in the leniency of some
local committees which took the justifications of verified communists as truth instead of
making  their  own  inquiry.50 Investigations  on  the  activities  of  the  communists  who
remained in occupied territory absorbed a huge amount of time, and the raikomy seemed
to have given the priority to other tasks. Moreover, their proximity to the field realities
probably  made them more sensitive  to  the  locals’  material  problems.  The provincial
committee took care in making it clear that Moscow attached great importance to the
purge, and cancelled all the local rulings based on generic and vague phrases, such as
“voluntarily remained in occupied territory,” “destroyed his membership card” or “did
not work for the Germans” (for reinstatements). In 1943, the Obkom approved a higher
rate of local decisions (90%), even if they still cancelled six percent of the total. The next
year, the rate was reversed; only 0.5% of the expulsions were cancelled against 4.5% of the
reinstatements. No major event accounts for this change; I shall assume that the district
committees finally assimilated the expectations of their hierarchy. In 1945, convergence
between regional and local visions was almost perfect: 96% of the decisions were ratified.
26 Initially, the reproaches addressed by the Kalinin Obkom to their subordinates found their
counterpart in the other liberated provinces. For instance, the report that the head of the
Voronezh  Orginstruktotdel sent  to  Shamberg  in  March  1942  bemoaned  the  massive
expulsions  pronounced  by  the  district  committees.  They  blurred  and  harmed  the
“explanation work” that the purge was expected to generate inside the Party.51 Thus, at
the highest  levels  of  Party power,  it  was clear  that  the process  did not  only pursue
concrete purifying goals,  but also bore an essential normative dimension. Indeed, the
Central Committee was well informed of the many tasks that the local Party committee
had to  cope  with  in  the  aftermath  of  a  ravaging  occupation,  when the  government
demanded huge human and material participation from the provinces to sustain the war
effort. Moreover, the NKVD quickly told its hierarchy as well as the Party committees that
the most compromised collaborators had fled westwards with the Wehrmacht. So the
meticulous  verification  of  all  the  local  communists  did  not  only  aim at  discovering
dangerous traitors; there was a symbolic purpose of the purge, which only the Party was
empowered to define and display.
 
Purifying the vanguard of society, redefining values
and norms of behavior
Each Party member has begun to feel that he is a
fully valued unit, who is tied to the general
collective of the Party, and who is responsible for
the whole.52
27 In 1939, Zhdanov congratulated himself on the collective spirit of the Party, which had
just been through terrible ordeals in the previous years. In Kalinin, the 1935 expulsions
decided during the replacement of the membership cards had provoked a first significant
fall  of  the  number  of  activists.  Then,  the  Great  Purges  struck  and  cost  the  Party
organization 1,000 more members (see table 3). After undesirables had been expelled, the
recruitment campaign of 1939-1941 led to a twofold increase of Party numbers. The war
was to shake a renewed and frail organization.
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Table 3. The number of Kalinin activists, 1935-1941
Source: Ocherki istorii Kalininskoi organizatsii KPSS (M., Moskovskii rabochii, 1971), 690.
28 A  first  bulk  of  reproaches  intersected  with  the  judiciary  repression  going  on
simultaneously and brought the logic of the Great Terror to its close.53 Here, the purpose
of the expulsions was to purify the Party of those who managed to disguise their true
nature until the war but were eventually unmasked while they chose to work for the
occupier.  But  many  other  Party  members  were  expelled  for  a  lot  of  reasons  more
symbolic than related to a concrete crime of treason. I shall successively examine these
two sets of motives in order to assess the complex meaning of the purge.
 
The Party purge followed the judiciary repression
29 Historians of the Western postwar purges have underlined the intricate relation between
the judiciary repression and the administrative, economic and social purges of those who
brought disgrace on national honor.54 While new laws condemned ex post facto some kinds
of behavior which were not illegal at the time they were adopted, extensive processes of
cleansing developed in State and local administrations, enterprises, and in cultural and
media  circles.  Sometimes,  dismissals  or  reductions  in  rank  were  added  to  a  judicial
sentence,  but  not  systematically.  In other words,  the “administrative” purge allowed
society to purify itself deeper than justice alone could do.
30 Generally  speaking,  important  forms  of  administrative  and  economic  collaboration
(functions of starshina, burgomaster, factory director, head of an economic department in
the Municipality…) and espionage for the enemy were prosecuted by Soviet penal organs.
They usually led to heavy sentences, from eight to ten years of detention in labor camps
up to death penalty. In the Party, the punishment was expulsion, always accompanied by
a dismissal  from the job,  be there or not judiciary prosecution.  The Party’s  claim to
embody the  vanguard  of  society  and to  lead  the  people  toward  the  Bolshevik  goals
logically resulted in the rejection of compromised communists. It was inconceivable to
keep within the Party people whose loyalty turned out to be fragile.
31 Then, in the liberated USSR, a first group of expulsion criteria mostly tallied with the
penal charges: blatant collaboration was at the core of it. Several ex-State officials, often
chairmen of collective farms or of rural soviets, were thus expelled from the Party for
administrative  collaboration  with  the  invader  (reason (c),  table  4).  For  instance,  the
previous  chairman  of  Belogurovo  soviet,  in  the  Zubtsov  district,  was  sanctioned  for
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accepting the responsibility of  starshina (head)  of  the Belogurovo county and starosta
(elder) of the village. He eventually fled with the German troops when the Red Army came
and freed the district.55 The conclusions of E. Beliaeva’s case were more detailed: not only
had she accepted to be a county starshina, but she had also scrupulously fulfilled her duty,
sending regular accounts about the situation of the population, of the food stocks, and so
on. She had even prepared a plan in order to gather 19 cows and deliver them to the
Wehrmacht.56 In some cases, facts of administrative collaboration were aggravated by a
charge of denunciation. A. Mironov, a 50-year-old collective farmer who joined the Party
in 1931, confessed that he had accepted the function of starosta and interpreter of his
village. One may suppose that he had been in German or Austrian captivity during the
First  World  War,  which would explain his  language skills.  The decision of  expulsion
stipulated that in addition, he had denounced Soviet partisans and soldiers to the enemy.
57
 
Table 4. Causes of expulsion from the Party intersecting with penal charges, 1942-1945
Source: RGASPI, f.17, op.43, d.743-754; op.44, d.547-554; op.45, d.733-739.
32 Another  frequent  charge  was  economic  collaboration,  presented  as  voluntary  or  as
aggravated by the consequences it led to. I. Zorin had both these criteria against him.
Aged 24 when his  district  was  invaded,  he belonged to the generation of  the young
managers who received their education after the Revolution, and he joined the Party in
1940, probably in relation to his appointment to the direction of Kunia linen factory. The
regional  conclusions  about  his  expulsion  stated  that  Zorin  “had  taken  the  path  of
betrayal”  since  the  very  first  days  of  occupation  and  had  himself  suggested  to  the
Germans to let him keep his position.58 Charges of collaborating by helping to repair
damaged equipment, such as electric stations, factories, and so on, often appear in the
expulsions for economic collaboration.59
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33 On the whole, this first kind of expulsion (reason (c)) corresponds to the penal crime of
holding official positions in the administrative or economic structures of the occupation
regime.  Another  form  of  betrayal,  not  prosecuted  before  the  tribunals,  caught  the
attention of the Party committees: the “spontaneous” registration as a communist with
the occupation administration or police. Actually, this act complied with official German
orders:  disobeying  orders  meant  consciously  risking  one’s  life.  But  as  registration
prevented communists from leading any further underground activity, which was one of
the prime duties of the activists, Soviet authorities considered it as an act of treason. Two
situations  were  possible:  either  Party  members  spontaneously  came  to  the  German
powers because they heard about the order and feared for their lives,60 or they complied
with  a  summoning  sent  by  the  German  kommandantur,  and  then  confessed  their
membership,61 or even disavowed the Party. For instance, I. Belodedov was sanctioned for
remaining in occupied territory without any authorization and for signing a renunciation
of his Party membership after five days in a Gestapo jail.62
34 Another very frequent reproach was of being arrested, questioned and then released by
the Germans.  This  was  the case  for  a  rural  soviet  chairman who survived after  two
summonings at the kommandantur and then worked on the construction of fortifications
and the clearing of roads.63 In such cases, the Party committees suspected a deal: work,
espionage or denunciation for survival. Once again, the purge criteria met those of the
penal repression. For instance, E. Shliakova, who had been arrested by the German police
on December 8, 1941, was afterwards accused of denouncing a comrade from the same
factory (but his name and fate were not stipulated).64 In 1943, Party rulings began to use
the phrase “has been working for the Gestapo” and “has been in contact with the German
police.”65 This accusation often went along with the charge of denouncing Soviet patriots
to the enemy. Sometimes, the spying activity, or at least a verbal commitment of that
kind, was proven: the verified communists acknowledged they had signed a declaration
binding them to identify Soviet partisans and activists. The case of V. Sidorova, the young
chair  of  a  collective  farm  who  was  under  arrest  when  the  Party  examined  her
membership, was no exception.66 However, according to the judiciary proceedings I was
able to examine, in 1942 and even in 1943, this kind of incrimination was often used
against the accused even when there was no proof in police records (of the death of the
supposed victim, of interaction between the accused and the German forces, etc.).67
35 On  the  whole,  the  bulk  of  reasons  similar  to  the  penal  repression  represented
approximately 8 to 10% of the total number of expulsions from the Party in 1942-1945,
with a  peak to 23% in 1943.  This  suggests  that  the communists  trapped in occupied
territory most often tried to avoid blatant collaboration with the enemy. The statistics
provided by J. Jones’ study of the “reconstruction” in Rostov province point to a similar
conclusion,  except  for  the  educational  professions,  where  the  rate  of  collaboration
appeared to be high.68 The most frequent type of communist collaboration I observed in
Party documents as well as proceeding records was the keeping of one’s assignment as
chairman of a collective farm (becoming starosta under the occupation) or as chairman of
a  rural  soviet  (becoming  starshina under  the  Germans),  and  the  registration  as  a
communist  with  Nazi  powers.  In  the  latter  case,  registered  communists  had  not
systematically gone to work for the enemy.
36 The common features with the penal repression, at least at the beginning of the latter,
encompass  a  second  kind  of  behavior.  First,  the  fact  of  fulfilling  compulsory  tasks
imposed by the invader (reason (b), table 4): clearing the roads from snow, washing the
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soldiers’  clothes,  providing  housing  and  food  to  the  enemy… This  also  includes  the
performance of banal and unskilled activity in order to survive or sometimes to help
one’s fellow citizens. For example N. Grigor´ev, 56 years old, worked as a carpenter at the
local hospital and also helped out at the mill. These duties seem all the more insignificant
as  Grigor´ev  used  to  be  a  foreman  at  the  Kalinin  carriage  factory,  where  he  was
specialized in machine repair: undoubtedly, a skill far more useful to the German army.69
The State Prosecutor’s order of May 15, 1942 partly decriminalized this sort of activity,
probably because it was usually compulsory, widespread and did not really hinder the
Soviet war effort.70 But in the Party purge, this form of collaboration represented 46 to
49% of the causes of expulsion in 1942-1943. However, there was a change in favor of
leniency during the summer of 1942. At the sessions of the Obkom bureau of August 5 and
12, for instance, several communists who had been expelled by their local committee for
performing this kind of work were reinstated by the Obkom according to the logic of the
order of May 15: the tasks accomplished by these people were declared “insignificant”
and sometimes even “patriotic” (when they covered underground sabotage in favor of the
Red Army or assistance to the local partisans).71 This pattern of expulsion decreased in
the following years:  31.2% in 1944, 29.2% in 1945, most probably because of the legal
reflections of 1942-1943 introducing greater nuances in the assessment of collaboration
crimes.72 The Party may also have experienced problems with a lack of cadres, which
could partly explain the turn to leniency (in the case of low-level leaders). Moreover, it is
very likely that the cases were quickly examined after each liberating offensive. Most of
these communists obviously did not feel guilty before the Party, and they quickly came to
their committee to be registered,73 which explains the predominance of this reason in the
expulsion decisions of 1942 and 1943.
37 Frequenting the enemy or  displaying sympathy to him also remind of  some charges
presented in the judiciary or extralegal repression (reason (d)). This group of people had
not compromised themselves on a political or military level but they had betrayed their
community on a symbolic level because they seemed to be delighted with the German
presence. Moscow progressively defined a penal sanction, finally (in 1943) applying to
them the notion of “socially dangerous elements”74 widely used during the extralegal
repressions of the 1930s. But the Party did not wait for that decision: as early as the
beginning of 1942, two communists were expelled for this reason, and 32 more in the
second term of the same year.75
38 Last, a last group of people was banned from the Party according to a logic reminding
that of the resolution of the State Defense Committee of June 24, 1942.76 The members
knew that their father, spouse or sibling had served the enemy and had hidden this fact
afterwards (reason (e)). For example, the Party reproached M. Dorofeeva that she had not
opposed  her  husband  becoming  the  caretaker  of  building  no.  86  in  the  Proletarskii
worker city.77 E. Deviatkova was accused of not helping a partisan unit whereas she had
been appointed head of its supplies. Moreover, she got close to a deserter from this unit, a
“traitor and a German spy whom she hid at her house.”78 This cause of expulsion never
exceeded 10% of the whole amount of expulsions and was always associated with another
reason,  such as staying in occupied territory,  or hiding a compromising relationship.
Thus, even though A. Gromova had been promoted as chair of a rural soviet after the
liberation, she was nonetheless excluded from the Party and dismissed from her job in
October 1942, when the police discovered she kept a friendship with and protected a
certain Gorbunova, former secretary of the collaborator Voronov.79
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39 On the whole, the Party purge intersected with the criteria of the judiciary repression of
traitors and collaborators, just going further in the punishment of collaboration crimes,
punishing by expulsion acts that were not prosecuted by the court.80 In this respect, the
purge was part of a global purification of society. But the process also used a second set of
criteria which reminds of François Rouquet’s conclusions on the postwar administrative
purge in France:  a  large gap lay between the actual  acts  and their  portrayal  by the
purging organs.  This portrayal  revealed the specific expectations of  Party authorities
toward their activists, in contrast to society as a whole. Party authorities had a highly
politicized  understanding  of  the  petty  facts  of  collaboration,  whereas  the  deeds
themselves were most often committed out of fear or hunger.81 In fact, the purge literally
served the double purpose of regenerating society and redefining the values and norms of
Party behavior.  This  portrayal  revealed the specific  expectations of  Party authorities
toward their activists, in contrast to society as a whole.
 
The Party purge specificity: crime by omission
40 Though they did not have a detailed picture of it, Soviet authorities knew of the main
lines of the occupation regime even before the purge started. Some documents witness a
high degree of awareness about the hard situation of the communists who were trapped
in invaded territory. A note sent by Shamberg to the Central Committee secretaries in
March 1943 underlined the bravery of many of them, provided examples of the different
kinds  of  resistance  and evoked the  high number  of  executed heroes.  Shamberg also
admitted that the faltering communists had found themselves isolated after the invasion
because of the failure of local  Party committees which had not managed to organize
underground cells beforehand, and afterwards did not send people to help the trapped
comrades.  The  head of  the  Orginstruktotdel openly  acknowledged that  even the  most
active and determined communists had not been able to undertake any action in the
absence of any direction.82
41 Anyway, the reproach of cowardice remained an almost irrefutable cause of exclusion
from the start of the purge to its end. At the beginning, cowardice was identified with the
loss or the destruction of the membership card during the invasion or the occupation
(reason (b),  table  5).83 A genuine paranoia  had been attached to this  topic since the
prewar years, as illustrates Ivan Pyriev’s film The Party Card (1935). A common idea was
that a lost card could be used by a spy to learn some important information.84 But in
reality, losing – or most often destroying – one’s card had no impact on the conflict and
could  even  appear  as  a  clever  move  considering  the  tragic  fate  that  awaited  most
communists and State officials if  they were caught by the Nazis.85 Besides, the Soviet
agents sent for special tasks in the enemy rear used to leave their membership card at the
Obkom before leaving. Therefore, punishing someone for card loss was a purely symbolic
measure: by destroying their Party document, members renounced the “noble name of
communist” when they were confronted with danger. This symbolic gesture raised the
question of how members adopted the communist identity and the whole ethos linked
with it. Indeed, the Party had acquired the role of combative vanguard, driving force for
the transformation of society – which justified its dominance over the people. This role
implied rules of behavior that any member should be able to follow on a sole injunction of
the hierarchy.86
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Table 5. Causes of expulsion unrelated to penal prosecutions, 1942-1945
Source: RGASPI, f.17, op.43, d.743-754; op.44, d.547-554; op.45, d.733-739.
42 In the first year, this cause of expulsion appeared in 36.2% of the cases. This act was
heavily sanctioned both by local and provincial committees, even when the communists
in question had succeeded in escaping to free territory. For instance, the Obkom bureau
cancelled the decision of  Proletarskii  district  committee which had reinstated citizen
Frolova in the Party because she had managed to reach Kashin: the final decision stated
that she had destroyed her membership card during her flight.87 On the contrary, keeping
one’s Party document could protect the owner from the harshest sanction if other faults
were committed. A. Esaulova, a young woman who had performed small tasks for the
Germans,  only  received  an  official  warning  because  she  had  kept  her  card.88 More
surprisingly, some men also benefitted from such leniency, as I. Bavilkin, 46 years old,
who could not flee when the invader came because of health problems. In this case, the
man could rely on his 18-year experience in the Party, on the fact that he was still sick
when the committee ruled on his case, and on the fact that he kept his card.89
43 Studying the evolution of the “cowardice” reproach allows us better to understand this
mechanism. At the end of 1942, the reproach of refusing to fight in occupied territory
succeeded that  of  losing one’s  card as  the main symbol  of  cowardice.  The notion of
passivity in the hostile rear appeared in 1942 in decisions against men who stayed in
invaded  territory.  T.  Zhukov’s  case  is  exemplary.  First,  this  46-year-old  citizen  was
reinstated in the Party thanks to his good professional appraisal.  Then the provincial
committee cancelled this ruling, pointing to the fact that Zhukov had not evacuated and
had destroyed his card, and adding that “he had not led any fight in the enemy rear.”90
This  new  accusation  was  always  linked  to  the  reproach  of  remaining  in  occupied
territory, another main cause of expulsion. Indeed, this fact was always considered as
resulting from choice and not accident.91 The phrase “did not try anything to evacuate
while  he (she)  had the whole opportunity to do it”  became a leitmotiv of  expulsion
decisions, making official the denial of a collective failure to organize and implement the
evacuation.92 Women only – and not often – could be forgiven if they had children in their
charge. On the opposite, men were almost always expelled, whatever be their past or
present professional appraisal.  A legless man in his sixties was thus expelled in 1943
because he did not manage to flee.93
44 These three criteria – card loss, passivity in the fight and “voluntary” stay in occupied
territory – are essential to understand the meaning of the purge. They presuppose the
absolute internalization of the communist ethos, denying the chaotic circumstances of
evacuation and then occupation, and put forward the member’s inability to act according
to the implanted rules. This point really seems to differentiate this purge from the others,
emphasizing more than ever the meaning of the individuals’ acts, allowing to unmask
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“double-faced” individuals by using the method of “revelation by one’s acts.”94 According
to E. Cohn, after the Great Purges,
with  only  a  few  exceptions  […],  the  party  never  again  sought  to  reshape  its
membership through mass purges or to use the party discipline system to stamp
out the opposition or to unmask conspiracies against the Soviet state. Indeed, party
documents  proclaimed  the  need  to  judge  misconduct  by  Communists  on  “an
individual  basis,”  guaranteeing  (in  principle)  a  careful  examination  of  a
Communist’s behavior by a variety of party organs.95
45 The new method can also help us understand why the Party hierarchy repeatedly stressed
the importance of an individual approach to the cases, of taking into account personal
and incidental characteristics of each file and of avoiding empty and meaningless labels.
As soon as February 25, 1942, Kalinin Obkom invited
the  district  and city  committees  to  carefully  examine the  documents  about  the
behavior of the communist in occupied territory, to follow an in-depth individual
approach, not tolerating liberalism nor unjustified expulsion.96
46 In the insignificant act of destroying a membership card, the Party authorities read a lack
of investment in the collective project, a fatal sign that priority was given to personal
interests, and an inability to follow the Bolshevik rules of behavior. According to the head
of Voronezh’s Orginstruktotdel, panic reactions revealed the secret nature of people:
At  the  most  dangerous  time,  when  the  fate  of  our  province  and  of  the  whole
country is threatened, they show their actual face of profiteers and cowards, for
whom the care for personal comfort appeared more important than the interests of
the Party and the socialist State.97
47 Refusing to take risks and sacrifice oneself  in the name of the sacred defense of the
regime resulted from the same flaw which proved that these communists did not deserve
a place in the vanguard of society. The party as a whole, indeed, was propelled to the rank
of heroes. True, the combative ethos of the Bolsheviks had been there since the origins
and had significantly contributed to the construction of a mystical representation of the
Party. The Civil War had exacerbated this dimension, then the great economic or social
“campaigns” of the 1930s had sustained the combative ethos in a permanent revival of
the spontaneous mobilization of the masses under the slogans of “fight against…”98 But
the ultimate confrontation with an absolute ideological opponent was the decisive test
for the Party members, especially for those who joined the organization after the Great
Purge.
48 However, this logic posed a major problem. The Stalinist “individuation,” accomplished
from outside by the members of the group,99 was suddenly transformed into a totally new
demand  of  individualization.  The  Party  committees  blamed  communists  who  were
suddenly cut off from their cell by the circumstances of the Nazi invasion for not making
the good choice by themselves, without any order from the collective. After promoting
for years the “Party discipline” and the collective spirit, the organization reproached its
members for a lack of initiative in front of danger: they should have found the location of
the partisan unit, imagined a way to cross the frontline or to sabotage enemy measures.
Of course, the demand of initiative was in fact very limited, since in this picture, taking
initiative complied with the supposedly natural behavior of a communist in this kind of
situation.  Nevertheless,  the  invasion  and  the  reaction  of  the  Party  member  actually
constituted a test of the “communist conscience” of every activist: it revealed whether
the  last  remains  of  bourgeois  past  had  actually  been  crushed  in  the  minds  of  the
communists.
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49 These  unfulfilled  expectations  could  explain  the high  rate  of  expulsion  of  freshly
recruited members: in 1941, 50% of Kalinin communists had been in the Party for less
than three years.100 Sixteen out of  21 communists listed as collaborators by Toropets
NKVD in April 1942 had joined the Party between 1939 and 1941.101 From this point of
view, the purge fitted out in a Party routine consisting in a cleansing of the ranks after a
large recruitment which had blurred the frontier between the vanguard and the rest of
society. But now, the “good” member should know how to make true Stalin’s summons of
July 3, 1941 about “giving up carefreeness, mobilizing,” “ignoring fear during the fight
and selflessly going into the patriotic and liberating war against fascist slave drivers.”102 It
was unthinkable and intolerable that the generation brought up after the Revolution
could not “reveal themselves by their acts as worthy of the name of communist.”
50 In early 1946, the local committee of Proletarskii district presented the outcome of the
purge in the most affected district of the province (733 communists were expelled). The
list of purged people illustrates this concern of differentiation according to individual
situations, a concern that grew over time and levels of decision.103 The district committee
adopted very different decisions towards people of the same category: the case of those
members who tried to evacuate but chose the wrong direction and ended up in occupied
territory is the most telling. Ten of them were reinstated without any punishment, 73
received an official warning and 244 were expelled from the Party.104 The category of
communists who failed to escape because they suffered health diseases or were in charge
of elderly infirm relatives usually enjoyed a certain leniency from the committee: 32 out
of  66  were  reinstated,  and  seven  did  not  even  receive  any  warning.  As  far  as  the
provincial  committee is  concerned,  its  rulings  show an actual  will  of  differentiation,
attenuating the sanction of four members who were either sick in 1941, or in charge of a
family, whereas the local committee, as I pointed out, had already spared this category.
But, on the contrary, the Obkom aggravated the punishment of six other representatives
of this same group. Even more striking: the provincial committee mitigated the fate of 26
communists who tried to flee but did not succeed, and hardened the sanction of seven
others.  Last,  it  followed  a  very  individual  approach  in  dealing  with  the  category  of
communists who remained in occupied territory “without any valid reason”: whereas the
raikom had pronounced 245 expulsions and 18 warnings, the Obkom ratified 214 decisions,
attenuated  21,  hardened  seven  and  decided  that  eight  people  did  not  deserve  any
sanction.
51 What can explain these differences inside the same category of behavior? Age does not
seem to play a significant role. On the whole, the age structure of the 733 members who
remained  in  occupied  territory  conforms  to  the  age  structure  of the  Party  itself:  a
majority of potentially working adults (459 persons between 26 and 49), a sizeable part of
people of the older generation (266 persons over 50) and a low number of young people
(eight were less than 25). According to the purge decisions, the youth mostly tried to
escape from the enemy while more representatives of the two other categories stayed in
invaded territory “without any valid reason.”
52 The gender distribution of the group is more telling: it corresponds to a society at war,
where men are serving on the front. Women constitute 75% of the communists who had
remained in occupied territory; as for the men, they were almost always sanctioned with
greater severity. On one hand, the authorities expected that they resisted to the enemy.
On the other hand, men seldom had the charge of the elderly and young children: they
therefore could hardly justify their presence in invaded territory. A same bureau session
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could thus show both adamant severity and concern in case differentiation. For example,
at the Obkom bureau session of May 20, 1942, a 27-year-old woman escaped punishment,
despite her failure to evacuate and the loss of her card, because she had a good Party
appraisal and was responsible of two young children at the moment of invasion.105 Several
other  women who had  tried  to  flee  and  destroyed  their  card  were  forgiven.  But  T.
Zhukov, a 46-year-old man punished by an official warning by his district committee, was
expelled by  the  provincial  committee  just  because  he  lost  his  membership  card and
stayed in his village during the occupation.106
53 A closer look at what the Obkom considered a “valid reason” reveals the flexibility of this
notion. For example, V. Kashirina and I. Shitov were reinstated because the first one was
considered too old to flee and the second one was sick when the Germans arrived.107 The
committee cancelled an expulsion decision ruled against A. Usova, a 60-year-old doctor
who was  trapped  in  invaded  Kalinin  because  she  was  waiting  for a  car  in  order  to
evacuate her patients from the town.108 During its session of December 17, 1942, the
Obkom forgave a woman who cooked for the Germans and washed their laundry without
even evoking the excuse of coercion; the decisive fact here seemed to be her excellent
past professional appraisal.109 The Obkom forgave several similar cases during this session.
On the contrary, the provincial committee expelled F. Dement´eva, 42 years old, because
she came back in occupied Kalinin after the village where she fled had also been invaded
and because she had lost her membership card.110
54 Beyond the main logics exposed above, some decisions remain obscure. For instance, why
was  35-year-old  Vladimir  Usanov  spared  though  he  came  back  to  Kalinin  after  the
invasion of the village where he fled and did not lead any resistance activity? Neither the
raikom nor the Obkom punished him.111 The same is true for M. Ibragimov, 51, who was
expelled  by  the  local  committee  for  the  very  same  reasons,  but  reinstated  by  the
provincial one in September 1942. One may assume these surprising outcomes had much
to do with the lack of cadres after the liberation, as the example of Rostov much better
illustrates.112
55 It often seems that enigmatic decisions, reinstatements or expulsions, were in fact based
as much on the members’ reactions to invasion and occupation as on their behavior since
the liberation. The expulsion cases based on passivity in Party life since the liberation,
which remind of the criteria of the second phase of the 1935 purge,113 appeared as early as
1942;  they  were  often  linked  to  a  refusal  to  pay  Party  dues.  Shortly  after,  another
reproach emerged: not coming to the registration announced after the liberation. The
decisions  of  expulsion labeled  this  attitude  as  “detachment  from Party  life.”  On the
contrary,  many  reinstatement  rulings  were  based  on  the  general  behavior  of  the
communist towards work or militant activity. For instance, V. Burkina, 60, was expelled
by her raikom because she fled to a village that was invaded afterwards and because she
could not retrieve her membership card – which she had hidden in a warehouse burnt by
the enemy during their retreat. The city committee replaced the expulsion by an official
warning, arguing that she really tried to escape and especially that she had excellent
professional and militant appraisal.114 Similarly, M. Ivanova only received a warning even
though she had destroyed her card and stayed in invaded territory; she had attempted to
flee but failed, probably because of her dependent relatives – an infant and elder parents.
The  Obkom bureau  decision  stated  that  she  had  earlier  distinguished  herself  as  an
excellent commander of the civil antiaircraft defense.115
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56 The overlapping of criteria produces the impression, growing with time, that the war
purge allowed a comprehensive purge of Party ranks, based on an upward reappraisal of
the demands concerning investment in the Bolshevik project, during the occupation and
after  the  liberation.  In  Kalinin,  the  confusion  of  the  criteria  leading  to  sanctions
sometimes went as far as to arouse Central Committee concern: in June 1944, the highest
Party organ expressed surprise about the collective expulsion of about 20 skilled workers
of the Proletarka plant. They were all long-standing Party members and did not stay in
occupied territory; the reason of their expulsion was that they “got detached from the
Party”  during  the  war.  But  the  Central  Committee’s  inspector  considered  them  as
“reliable.”116 Thus, the more the purge went on, the more it followed the logic that E.
Cohn identified in the postwar years:
Many seemingly trivial organizational questions took on great symbolic importance
in the party discipline process […] At the same time, any Communist accused of
misconduct would be judged not only on the facts of the case, but on whether he
was a conscientious Communist who paid his dues and went to meetings.117
 
Conclusion
57 For Party members, the Second World War was indeed the “Armageddon of Revolution”118
: it revived original values of the good Bolshevik (fighting spirit and sense of sacrifice for
the collective project) while confirming the new method of appraising Party members by
scrutinizing their intimate conscience, supposedly revealed by their acts. At the same
time, the ordeal did not only test communist pugnacity: more broadly, it questioned the
devotion and sincerity  toward the Party.  This  wider angle  preserved some members
despite their sojourn in occupied territory. But it deeply shook Party structures just when
the latter were central to the restoration of control over society.
58 Truly  speaking,  the  Party  purge  was  not  the  biggest  shock  that  the  organization
underwent during the war, in comparison with mobilization or evacuation. One may even
suppose the organs in charge of the purge took these factors into account when they
pronounced reinstatements in favor of equivocal cases. The accounts drawn up in 1948,
when the purge was completed in the province, present a total of 2,016 expulsions out of
2,705 examined cases, that is to say 74.3%. Furthermore, 340 out of the 393 decisions of
replacing  a  lost  card  (about  half  the  whole  number  of  reinstatements)  concerned
communists who did not live on occupied territory. Another thirty files were not even
examined by the provincial  committee because the members had died since the new
registration (22 of them) or because members were automatically retrieved from the lists
since they did not come to being registered (8).119 Thus if we look only at the communists
who remained in invaded territory, the expulsion rate raises to 85% of the 2,373 examined
cases, which proves the severity of the purge.
59 But the significance of the purge impact did not rely as much on its scope as on the fact
that the Party structures had lost a high number of activists on the front, during the
occupation and the displacements provoked by the invasion. The provincial organization
had 54,016 members at the beginning of 1941; at the end of the war, only 4,474 of these
54,016  remained,  for  a  total  number  of  31,016  regional  communists  in  June  1945.120
Undoubtedly, the expulsion of 2,000 valid members heavily weighed on the Party’s ability
to  supervise  society  after  the  liberation.  Indeed,  whereas  the  purge  developed  in
complete secrecy, the Party hierarchy constantly urged the local committees to foster
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new admissions. Yet this was a complicated task when the pool of recruitment in the war
years  was  almost  completely  limited  to  people  who  stayed  in  occupied  territory,
therefore suspected of disloyalty.
NOTES
1. Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik
Revolution (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 82.
2. Graeme J. Gill, The Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Houndmills, London:
The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1988), 40-42, 165-183. In his brilliant Ph.D. dissertation about
Party discipline from 1945 to 1961, E. Cohn underlines a shift in the post-war period:
whereas Party purges tended to be more sporadic and massive phenomena before the
war, they became a regular, albeit less harsh, phenomenon after the war. He explains this
evolution by a shift in the relative importance of the various goals of sanctions (punitive,
exclusive, pedagogical…). See Edward D. Cohn, “Disciplining the Party: The Expulsion and
Censure of  Communists  in the Post-War Soviet  Union,  1945-1961,”  Ph.D.  dissertation,
University of Chicago, 2007, 56-57.
3. On the growth of the obsessive fear of a “fifth column” from the 1920s to the war, see
the case of Chechnya, studied by Jeffrey Burds, “The Soviet War against ‘Fifth Columnists’:
The Case of Chechnya, 1942-1944,” Journal of Contemporary History, 42, 2 (2007): 267-314. As
for the transformation of the image of the internal enemy (vnutrennii vrag), see François-
Xavier Nérard, “Une image de l’étranger en URSS dans les années trente,” Bulletin de
l’Institut Pierre Renouvin,  6 (1998): 33-34 and Nicolas Werth, L’Ivrogne et la marchande de
fleurs: Autopsie d’un meurtre de masse, 1937-1938 (P.: Taillandier, 2009), 17.
4. Oleg  Kharkhordin,  The  Collective  and  the  Individual  in  Russia:  A  Stud  y  of  Practices
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999), 164-182.
5. For more details on the difference between these purges, see Chapter 8 of my doctoral
thesis: Vanessa Voisin, “L’épuration de guerre en URSS, à partir de l’exemple de la région
de Kalinine (1941-1953) [The War Purges in Soviet Union: A Study Based on the Case of
Kalinin Province, 1941-1953],” doctoral dissertation, université Paris 1, 2011.
6. For example, in his interesting chapter about the repression and purge of collaborators
in Rostov, Jeffrey Jones does not clearly distinguish between the simple activists and the
members of the Party occupying a position of management in State, economic or Party
structures (p.  164 ff.).  That  way,  he concludes to a  relative leniency of  the purge in
general, a position I do not agree with: Jeffrey W. Jones, “‘In my Opinion this is All a
Fraud!’:  Concrete,  Culture  and  Class  in  the  ‘Reconstruction’  of  Rostov-on-the-Don,
1943-1948,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2000.
7. On  the  western  purges,  see  Marc-Olivier  Baruch,  ed.,  Une  poignée  de  misérables:
L’épuration de la société française après la Seconde Guerre mondiale (P.: Fayard, 2003); István
Deak, Jan T. Gross, Tony Judt, eds., The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and its
Aftermath (Princeton: Princeton University press,  2000);  Luc Huyse,  Steven Dhondt,  La
Caught between war repressions and party purge
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011
21
répression des collaborations,  1942-1952 (Bruxelles:  CRISP,  1993);  Peter Novick,  L’Épuration
française,  1944-1949 (P.:  Éditions  Balland,  1985);  François  Rouquet,  L’Épuration  dans
l’administration française: Agents de l’État et collaboration ordinaire (P.: CNRS Éditions, 1993).
On Soviet historiography, see, for example, Ocherki istorii Kalininskoi organizatsii KPSS (M.:
Moskovskii rabochii, 1971).
8. Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War. See also A. Weiner, “The Making of a Dominant Myth:
The Second World War and the Construction of  Political  Identities  within the Soviet
polity,” The Russian Review, 55 (October 1996): 638-660.
9. Nathalie Moine, “Expérience de guerre, hiérarchie des victimes et justice sociale à la
soviétique,”  Cahiers  du  Monde  Russe,  49,  2-3  (avril-septembre  2008):  383-418;  Olaf
Mertelsmann,  Aigi  Rahi-Tamm,  “Cleansing  and  compromise:  The  Estonian  SSR  in
1944-1945,” ibid., 319-340; Valdis O. Lumans, Latvia in World War II (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2006); Geoffrey Swain, Between Stalin and Hitler: Class war and Race war on
the Dvina 1940-46 (London, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004); Elena Zubkova, Pribaltika i
Kreml´: 1940-1953 (M.: Rosspen, 2008).
10. Rebecca Manley, To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation and survival in the Soviet Union at War
(Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2008). See also Chapters 1 and 9 of my doctoral
dissertation (see note 5 above).
11. RGASPI  (Rossiiskii  gosudarstvennyi  arhiv  sotsial´no-politicheskoi  istorii  –  Russian
State Archive of Social and Political History), f. 17 (Central Committee), op. 88, 122.
12. I searched extensively in the op. 3 of fund 147 (Kalinin regional committee) and in the
funds of three districts committees (Proletarskii, f. 158; Rzhev, F. 148 and Zubtsov, f. 422)
in the TTsDNI, Tver´ Center of Documents on Contemporary History.
13. Tverskie arkhivy v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, 1941-1945. K 60-letiiu osvobozhdeniia g.
Kalinina, Arkhivnyi otdel administratsii Tverskoi oblasti, Tver´, 2001, p. 54-55.
14. TTsDNI, f.  158, op. 1, d. 79, l.  1-7: minutes of the 1st meeting of Proletarka Party
organization, January 4, 1942.
15. See, for example, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 20, l. 126-129: report from the head of the
political department of the 9th Army to the Orginstruktotdel of the Main Political Direction
of the Red Army, March 19, 1942. J. Jones observed a similar situation in Rostov province.
Right after the complete liberation of the province, the regional organization discussed
about the fate of the members who remained in occupied territory: Jones, “‘In my Opinion
this is All a Fraud!,’” 166.
16. RGASPI,  f.  17,  op.  88,  d.  172,  l.  4  (information  from Tishchenko,  Voronezh  first
secretary, to the Central Committee, January 23, 1943 and l. 12-19 (Tishchenko’s report to
Shamberg, February 12, 1943); Vladimir N. Haustov, Vladimir P. Naumov, N.S. Plotnikova,
Lubianka.  Stalini  NKVD-NKGB-GUK  R  “Smersh”  (193  9-  m  art  19  46) (M.:  Izd.  Materik,
Mezhdunarodnyi  Fond  “Demokratiia,”  2006),  364  (information  from  Rostov),  366
(Leningrad), 367-368 (Velikie Luki), 369-370 (republic of Kabardino-Balkariia); RGASPI, f.
17, op. 88, d. 597, l. 179: communiqué to Shamberg, Storozhev, Ratner and Karasev about
the XI plenum of Kursk provincial committee, September 7, 1943.
17. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 20, l. 75-76: Ratner’s report to A. Andreev, G. Malenkov, A.
Shcherbakov, January 11, 1942.
18. Undoubtedly, the context of war aggravated this phenomenon, but in the postwar
years, the highest Party authorities (notably the Party Control Committee) often blamed
the local committees for not paying enough attention to the conduct of their members.
Caught between war repressions and party purge
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011
22
Most  interestingly,  the  PCC  did  not  approve  situations  when  the  Party  committees
reacted only after the police had already arrested the communist, or after a court had
sentenced him: see Cohn, Disciplining the Party, 109-110.
19. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 20, l. 96-97.
20. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 743, l.  132ob: sixth point of the minutes of the session of
February 25, 1942.
21. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 573, l. 43-47: report to Andreev, Malenkov, and Shcherbakov of
March 1, 1942.
22. Weiner,  Making Sense  of  War,  97.  The author underlines that  the Ukrainian Party
Central Committee exerted the same pressure on local committees from 1944 to 1946 (
ibid., 90, 97-102).
23. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 20, l. 98.
24. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 597, l. 129: report from an official of the Central Committee
Orginstruktotdel to his chief, August 11, 1943.
25. The frequency was established by a systematic analysis of the minutes of the regional
bureau sessions devoted to the examination of communists’ personal files: RGASPI f. 17,
op. 43, d. 743-748 (1942); d. 749-754 (1943); op. 44, d. 547-554 (1944); op. 45, d. 733-739
(1945).
26. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 97-101, 122-126.
27. Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia, 164-167.
28. I systematically studied all the issues of Proletarkaia Pravda that were kept in the State
Archive (most of them) and those of the Rzhevskaia Pravda which were published after the
liberation of the district (the first issue was released in April 1943). I also looked at Soviet
newspapers and journals, such as Izvestiia, Krasnaia Zvezda, Bol´shevik, Voina i Rabochii Klass
and finally at specific editions designed for the Party agitators: Bloknot agitatora, Sputnik
agitatora. Amir Weiner noticed the same discretion in the province of Vinnitsa in 1944:
Weiner, Making Sense of War, 87.
29. A.  Bormotov,  “V  raione,  osvobozhdënnom  ot  nemetskikh  okkupantov,”  Partiinoe
Stroitel´stvo, 8 (April 1942): 30.
30. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 402: this file contains several explanations of simple members
who stayed on occupied territory (l. 148-150, 162-162ob, 175-176, 267-267ob, 303-304ob),
and of officials fearing dismissal and expulsion for an improper behavior before the
invasion or during the occupation. In this same file, one can find certificates written by
the local authorities about communists under verification: l. 259-259ob.
31. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 403, l. 43-49: certificates from Holm’s local filial of the NKVD,
May 11, 1942.
32. According to a joint resolution of the Central Committee and the government: Cohn,
Disciplining the Party, 106-107. For more on the relationship between Party sanction and
judicial prosecution, see Juliette Cadiot, “La justice soviétique ordinaire et la poursuite
pénale des membres du parti communiste (1945-1953), to be published in Jahrbücher für
Geschichte Osteuropas in 2012. I am grateful to the author for handing me her manuscript.
33. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 2744, l. 82: Central Committee resolution, November 30, 1943.
In July 1942, the Central Committee Orginstruktotdel told the regional committees that the
Party Statute did not bind them to let an excluded member attend the session where his
Caught between war repressions and party purge
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011
23
fate was decided for good: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 20, l. 164 (Ratner’s note to Malenkov,
July 20,1942).
34. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 573, l. 47.
35. TTsDNI f. 148, op. 3, d. 19, l. 10 (Obkom bureau session, June 10, 1942) and l.12 (session
of October 14, 1942).
36. At the Obkom bureau session of June 3, 1942, for instance, the communists who were
under arrest represented a quarter of the files examined that day (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d.
745, l. 12-27ob). The same was true for the session of June 10, 1942 (ibid., l. 45ob-60). In
October 1942, 6 out of 18 members verified by the regional committee were at the hands
of the NKVD (TTsDNI, f. 422, op. 1, d. 234, 241 and f. 148, op. 3, d. 19).
37. See, for example, the cases of E.D. Shliakova and E.I. Zurba: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d.
745, l. 19 and l. 25ob.
38. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 20, l. 107-108ob: Krylov’s report to Shamberg, April 18, 1942.
39. See note 19.
40. See map.
41. The Rostov figures are taken from RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 98, l. 90-104 (report from
the delegate of the Party Control Committee to Malenkov, October 9, 1945). According to
J.  Jones,  however,  there were critics at the regional level about the slow pace of the
verification,  which  prevented  the  local  activists  from  reestablishing  primary  cells.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1943 most of the cases had been examined: Jones, “‘In my
Opinion this is All a Fraud!,’” 168; 172-173.
42. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 744, l. 52ob (Turginovo district, April 27, 1942); d. 747, l. 2-2ob
(Ploskosh district, August 19); TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 402, l.292 (Kirov district, May 9,
1942).
43. See,  for  instance  TTsDNI,  f.  147,  op.  3,  d.  403,  l.  19  (report  from  the  head  of
Orginstruktotdel of Kalinin’s city committee, March 1942), l. 291 (report from the secretary
of Kirov district, not before March 18, 1942).
44. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 107.
45. Ibid., 95.
46. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 597, l. 32 et 135-136 (notes of July 2 and August 14, 1943,
Kursk), l. 53-54 (note of July 12, 1943, Voronezh), l. 285-86 (note of December 2, 1943, Orël)
op. 122, d. 584, l. 12 (note of October 14, 1943, Voronezh), op. 122, d. 63, l. 9 (note of
January 11, 1944, Kursk), l. 10 (note of January 25, 1944, Tatarstan), l. 43-45 (note of April
25, 1944, Stavropol), op. 88, d. 634, l. 13-14 (note of May 9, 1944, Kharkov), and so on.
47. TTsDNI,  f.  147,  op.  3,  d.  2744,  l.  79-90:  Simanov’s report to A.A. Andreev and I.P.
Boitsov, November 24, 1945.
48. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 402, l. 292: resolution taken by the bureau of Kirov district
committee, May 9 1942.
49. RGASPI,  f.  17,  op.  122,  d.  20,  l.  107-108ob:  report  from the Orginstruktotdel of  the
provincial committee to the Central Committee, April 18, 1942.
50. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 297, l. 69-70: report on the Party purge in Turginovo district
(April 1942).
51. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 116, l. 39-40: report from the Orginstruktotdel of Voronezh
provincial committee to Shamberg, received on March 15, 1942.
Caught between war repressions and party purge
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011
24
52. Conclusive  report  of  A.  Zhdanov at  the  XVIII  Party  congress  in  1939,  quoted  in
Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia, 86.
53. In 1934, after claiming there was no more opposed classes in the Soviet Union, Stalin
recommended vigilance towards the enemies infiltrated into the most vital organizations
of  the  country:  “careerists,  profiteers  and  bureaucratized  elements,”  “morally
degenerated”  members,  “double-faced  men”  (dvurushniki),  and  “alien  elements.”  See
Nicolas Werth, Les Procès de Moscou (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1987), 117: quotation
from the proceedings of the XVII Party Congress, 1934. The Party congress in February
1937 had unequivocally pointed out the new enemy, with a Party card in hand. The Great
Purge of 1937-1938 had aimed, among other things, at cleansing the Party and the ruling
circles from the people regarded as the less trustworthy on the eve of a war that seemed
more and more likely to take place. The Nazi invasion put the convictions and loyalty of
many communists to the test, and seemed to reveal the last inner enemies.
54. See note 7.
55. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 751, l. 3ob: the expulsion was ratified by the Obkom bureau on
June 6, 1943.
56. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 745, l. 110: the expulsion was ratified by the Obkom bureau on
June 17, 1942.
57. Ibid., l. 14: the expulsion was ratified by the Obkom bureau on June 3, 1942.
58. Ibid., l. 14ob: minutes of the Obkom bureau session, June 3, 1942.
59. TTsDNI, f. 148, op. 3, d. 19, l. 36 (mechanic of the Rzhev water tower, May 10, 1942),
TTsDNI, f. 422, op. 1, d. 241, l. 9 (stock manager of Zubtsov’s linen factory, November 18,
1942), RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 745, l. 24 (workman appointed to reconstruction work at
Kalinin’s  3rd  electric  station,  June  3,  1942),  ibid.,  l.  21ob  (workman  appointed  to
reconstruction work at Proletarskii weaving factory, June 3, 1942), etc.
60. Ratification of A. Shasetskin’s expulsion, June 3, 1942 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 745, l.
24), and of M. Baranov’s expulsion, June 20, 1942 (TTsDNI, f. 148, op. 3, d. 19, l. 99).
61. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 745, l. 22: ratification of A. Iakovleva’s expulsion, June 3, 1942.
62. Ibid., l. 25: ratification of I. Belodedov’s expulsion, June 3, 1942.
63. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 748, l. 25: a 35-year-old man, whose expulsion was confirmed
on October 28, 1942.
64. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 745, l. 19: the expulsion was ratified by the Obkom bureau on
June 3, 1942.
65. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 749, l. 13: ratification of N. Boikov’s expulsion, January 6, 1943.
The man had been the chairman of a rural soviet; he was arrested by the NKVD before the
Party studied his case.
66. TTsDNI, f. 148, op. 3, d. 19, l. 37: the expulsion was ratified by the Obkom bureau on
June 6, 1943.
67. As part of an overall study of war purges (dealing with the penal prosecution as well
as the Party and administrative purges), I studied about 80 proceeding records of people
condemned for collaboration in the province of Kalinin, mostly in 1942. These files are
kept  in  the  fund of  the  rehabilitated victims of  Soviet  political  repressions  (TTsDNI,
f.7849), so it is not really surprising that the inquiry lacked serious evidence. What is
more surprising is the fact that these individuals could have been condemned on the sole
Caught between war repressions and party purge
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011
25
charge of administrative/economic collaboration, but the NKVD insisted on bringing up
the accusation of denunciation.
68. Jones, “‘In my Opinion this is All a Fraud!,’” 170-171.
69. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 745, l. 20ob: the expulsion was ratified by the Obkom on June 3,
1942.
70. Sbornik  zakonodatel´nykh  i  normativnykh  aktov  o  repressiiakh  i  reabilitatsii  zhertv
politicheskikh repressii (M.: Izd-vo “Respublika”, 1993), 39-41.
71. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 746, l. 123-146 (Obkom bureau session of August 5, 1942) and l.
161-189 (session of August 12, 1942).
72. See Sergey Kudriashov, Vanessa Voisin, “The early stages of ‘legal purges’ in Soviet
Russia, 1941-1945,” Cahiers du Monde Russe, 49, 2-3 (avril-septembre 2008): 263-296.
73. Significantly, hiding one’s sojourn in occupied territory became a frequent criterium
for expulsion starting in 1944.
74. In April 1943, the Special Conference of the NKVD received the right of punishing as
“socially dangerous elements” (art. 35 of the 1926 Penal Code of the RSFSR) “the Soviet
citizens who, not being at German service, had willingly kept private relationships, either
intimate or friendly, with the occupation troops or with the officials of administrative or
repressive fascist organs if any information indicates that these individuals could be used
by  the  enemy  because  of  these  relationships”:  V.V.  Obukhov,  “Pravovye  osnovy
organizatsii  i  deiatel´nosti  voennykh  tribunalov  voisk  NKVD  SSSR  v  gody  Velikoi
Otechestvennoi voiny  1941-1945  gg.,”  doctoral  dissertation,  MVD Academy,  M.,  2002,
120-121.
75. RGASPI f. 17, op. 43, d. 743-748.
76. This resolution imposed the relegation for five years of the adult close relatives of a
traitor sentenced to death, with the exception of the families including a partisan or a
soldier serving in the Soviet armed forces. In April 1943, an order jointly signed by the
People’s commissars of Justice and of Internal Affairs and the State Prosecutor of the
USSR ordered the police and judiciary organs to intensify the repression of acts of treason
as well  as  close relatives of  traitors.  We must  here underline that  the Party showed
greater severity than Soviet law: relatives of any kind of traitor (was the latter sentenced
to death or not) were liable to expulsion.
77. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 745, l. 19: the expulsion was ratified by the Obkom bureau on
June 3, 1942.
78. Ibid., l. 15: the expulsion was ratified by the Obkom bureau on June 3, 1942.
79. TTsDNI, f. 148, op. 3, d. 19, l. 18: excerpt from the minutes of the session of the Obkom
bureau, October 14, 1942.
80. That is, when they chose the punishment – the harshest one even for petty forms of
collaboration; of course, it is hard to compare the fact of being expelled from the Party
with detention in labor camp or even the death penalty.
81. Rouquet, L’Épuration dans l’administration française.
82. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 595, l. 33-34: Shamberg’s note to the Central Committee, March
1943.
83. See also Jones, “‘In my Opinion this is All a Fraud!,’” 172-173.
84. Cohn, Disciplining the Party, 60-61.
Caught between war repressions and party purge
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011
26
85. The specific policies adopted by the Nazi invaders towards the members of the Party
are exposed in monographs on occupation in Soviet territory. For a synthetic overview,
see Dieter Pohl,  Die Herrschaft  der Wehrmacht:  deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische
Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941-1944 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008). Moscow was
quickly informed of the fate that awaited several categories of Soviet citizens under Nazi
rule (the Jews, the communists and State officials). Alexander Werth, who covered the
events of the eastern front for the Sunday Times and the BBC, recalls that everybody knew
the risks incurred by Party officials but the hierarchy nonetheless commanded them to
stay at their post until they were told otherwise: Alexander Werth, La Russie en guerre,
1941-1944 (P.: Tallandier, 2010), t. 1, 384.
86. Dietrich Beyrau, “The Bolshevik Project as a Plan and Social Practice,” Ab Imperio, 3
(2002): 367. The author underlines that many of these rules of behavior existed in the
Party  even  before  the  October  Revolution.  But  it  was  under  Stalin  that  the  “Party
discipline’’ progressively replaced the sole marxist ideology as a driving force to action
(364).
87. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 20, l. 108: report from the provincial Orginstruktotdel, April 18,
1942.
88. TTsDNI, f. 422, op. 1, d. 234, l. 35: minutes of the session of Zubtsov raikom bureau,
October 10, 1942.
89. TTsDNI, f. 422, op. 1, d. 234, l. 30ob: minutes of the session of Zubtsov raikom bureau,
October 3, 1942.
90. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 300, l. 108-109: session of the Obkom bureau of May 20, 1942.
91. V.  Voisin,  “Les  individus  demeurés  en  territoire  occupé:  aspects  singuliers  de
l’épuration soviétique, 1942-1949,” Revue d’Études Comparatives Est-Ouest, (2006): 198-236.
92. See  Manley  (R.),  To  the  Tashkent  Station and  Voisin,  “Les  individus  demeurés  en
territoire occupé…”
93. TTsDNI, f. 158, op. 1, d. 160, l. 12: list of the purged communists in Proletarskii district
(Kalinin), January 7, 1946.
94. The expression is borrowed to Oleg Kharkhordin: it means studying in details the acts
and thoughts of the communist.
95. Cohn, Disciplining the Party, 54.
96. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 743, l. l32ob: 6 th point of the minutes of the session of the
Obkom bureau, February 25, 1942.
97. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 116, l. 39-40: Pisenkevich’s report to Shamberg, March 15,
1942.
98. Beyrau, “The Bolshevik Project as a Plan and Social Practice,” 360-361, 366-368.
99. Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia, 164, 182-183.
100. Ocherki istorii Kalininskoi organizacii, 690.
101. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 108, l. 49-52. All of them were expelled from the Party.
102. E.N.  Kul´kov,  M.Iu.  Miakhkov,  O.A.  Rzheshevskii,  Voina 1941-1945 (M.:  Olma-Press,
2001), 351.
103. TTsDNI, f.  158, op. 1,  d.  60. The 1946 document draws a picture of the purge in
Proletarskii district starting in 1942.
Caught between war repressions and party purge
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011
27
104. On the hierarchy of Party sanctions and the frequent arbitrariness of the choice
between them, see Cohn, Disciplining the Party, 64-68.
105. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 300, l. 143: minutes of the session of the Obkom bureau, May
20, 1942.
106. Ibid., l. 109.
107. RGASPI,  f.  17,  op. 122, d.  20,  l.  107ob: report from Kalinin Orginstruktotdel to the
Central Committee, April 18, 1942.
108. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 300, l. 139: minutes of the session of the Obkom bureau, May
20, 1942.
109. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 43, d. 748, l. 242: 36 th of the minutes. The used phrase is “Kak
proizvodstvennitsu  i  kak  obshchestvenniku  RK  VKP(b)  kharakterizuet  t.  Trunovu  s
polozhitel´noi storony.”
110. RGASPI, f. 147, op. 43, d. 745, l. 20: minutes of the session of the Obkom bureau, June
3, 1942.
111. TTsDNI, f. 158, op. 1, d. 160, l. 4ob: list of the verified communists in Proletarskii
district, January 7, 1946.
112. Jones, “‘In my Opinion this is All a Fraud!,’” 164 and 168-172. Unfortunately, this very
good study does not clearly differentiate the fate of the cadres from that of the Party
members in general. In Kalinin, the treatment was very different when the purge touched
upon people necessary to relaunch economic activity (be there in the Party or not) and
the Party organization in general (be the members cadres or not). For details on this
difference, see my dissertation: “L’épuration de guerre en URSS…,” chap. 8.
113. Gabor T. Rittersporn, Simplifications staliniennes et complications soviétiques: Tensions
sociales et conflits politiques en URSS, 1933-1953 (P.: Editions des Archives Contemporaines,
1991), 91-92.
114. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 300, l. 110: minutes of the Obkom bureau session, May 20,
1942.
115. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 3, d. 297, l. 116ob: minutes of the Obkom bureau session, April 29,
1942.
116. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 634, l. 68: report from the Central Committee Orginstruktotdel,
June 3, 1944.
117. Cohn, Disciplining the Party, 61.
118. The phrase is taken from Weiner, Making Sense of War, 17.
119. TTsDNI, f. 147, op. 4, d. 497, l. 115: data on July 1st, 1948.
120. Ocherki istorii Kalininskoi organizatsii, 690, 508. The 25,000 lost members probably died
during the war, left the region or were expelled from the Party.
Caught between war repressions and party purge




The article tries to seize the role of the Second World War in the evolution of the criteria that
defined  the  good  communist.  This  evolution  completed  a  shift  initiated  in  the  1930s  from
genealogical criteria (social origin, political past...) to criteria focused on the communist’s inner
“self.” First, the author examines the launching and mechanisms of the purge from 1942 to the
immediate postwar years, at the national level as well as that of a region whose liberation started
early  in the  war.  For  Moscow,  the  purge  was  a  top  priority  despite  the  lack  of  activists  in
liberated territory. However, there was some misunderstanding between the various levels of
authority about the criteria of censure, expulsion or reinstatement. The second part of the article
examines  these  criteria  and  their  meaning  in  the  history  of  Soviet  Party  purges.  Some
communists were punished for the same motives that triggered judicial prosecution, whereas
others were heavily censured although their acts were not considered as crimes in the penal
system. The deep meaning of the purge lies in this second set of criteria: for Party members, the
Second  World  War  was  indeed  the  “Armageddon  of  Revolution”  (A.  Weiner).  It  revived  the
original  values of  the good Bolshevik (fighting spirit  and sense of  sacrifice for the collective
project) while confirming the new method of appraising Party members by scrutinizing their
intimate conscience, supposedly revealed by their acts. At the same time, the ordeal did not only
test communist pugnacity: more broadly, it questioned sincerity and devotion to the Party. This
broader  viewpoint  preserved  some  members  despite  their  sojourn  in  occupied  territory.
However, it deeply shook Party structures just when the latter were central to the restoration of
control over society.
Résumé
L’article tâche d’apprécier le rôle de la Seconde Guerre mondiale dans l’évolution des critères
définissant  le  bon membre du parti,  dans le  prolongement d’un glissement,  initié  durant les
années  1930,  de  critères  généalogiques  (origine  sociale,  passé  politique...)  vers  des  critères
centrés  sur  le  « soi » intime  de  l’individu.  Tout  d’abord,  le  texte  étudie  le  lancement  et  le
fonctionnement de la purge, de 1942 à l’immédiat après-guerre, tant à l’échelle soviétique qu’à
celle d’une région dont la libération débuta précocement. Pour Moscou, l’épuration constituait
une priorité essentielle, en dépit de la pénurie de militants dans les zones libérées. On observe
cependant une certaine confusion entre les différents niveaux d’autorité quant aux critères de
sanction, d’expulsion ou de maintien. La seconde partie de l’article se penche sur les critères eux-
mêmes et leur signification dans l’histoire des purges du parti bolchevik. Certains communistes
furent punis pour des raisons similaires à celles qui suscitaient au même moment des poursuites
judiciaires, tandis que d’autres furent lourdement sanctionnés malgré l’absence de crime (au sens
pénal) dans leurs agissements. Le sens profond de la purge repose dans ce second ensemble de
motifs  de  sanction :  pour  les  membres  du  parti,  le  second  conflit  mondial  fut  bien
« l’Armageddon de la Révolution » (A. Weiner). Il ranima les valeurs originelles du bon bolchevik
(esprit combatif et sens du sacrifice personnel au nom du projet collectif) tout en enracinant le
recours à la nouvelle méthode d’évaluation des membres du parti : l’examen de leur conscience
intime, supposée se révéler dans leurs actes. En même temps, la guerre ne testa pas uniquement
la  pugnacité  des  militants :  plus  généralement,  elle  mit  à  l’épreuve leur  dévouement  et  leur
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sincérité à l’égard du parti. Cet angle de vue plus large permit à certains communistes restés en
territoire  occupé  de  ne  pas  être  épurés.  Néanmoins,  la  purge  ébranla  profondément  les
structures partisanes alors même que celles-ci étaient essentielles au rétablissement du contrôle
du parti sur la société.
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